The Module: Crisis of a Paradigm ous piece of cortical tissue specialized to serve one cognitive function or to represent one essential aspect of the information processed by it. Many such modules The New Cognitive Neurosciences, Second Edition working together would make and explain the mind.
possibly to innervate higher and more complex modules, on his way home, looks for it assiduously around the lamppost, "because here there's light." Despite the which would integrate simple features into complex categories of perception. Further, cells in those areas "double dissociations" of lesion studies, which are rare, or the variations of stimulation and mapping parameters seemed to encode more complex sensory stimuli than those in primary cortex. The conceptual framework was of microelectrode studies, which are rarely exhaustive, the reader of those studies is often left with unanswered thus laid out for a hierarchical organization of ever more complex modules-with increasingly larger columnar questions about other cortical areas, other layers, other tasks, other stimuli, etc. In cognitive neuroscience, no arrangements-to accommodate ever higher aspects of cognition.
one has yet solved the core problem of Francis Bacon's inductive method of scientific inquiry, which we all faithIn the higher levels of that theoretical edifice, anatomists and physiologists met neuropsychologists, who fully follow; somewhere after all, there may be a black swan, or a gray one. were eager to localize in the brain their own constructs of cognitive function-mostly derived from studies of the Another source of confusion, no less common, is to infer the absolute or categorical function of a brain struceffects of cortical damage. The result of the intellectual alliance of those three groups of scientists was, in the ture from relative differences of some sort. we add to all that the imponderables of inhibition and of neural-hemodynamic coupling, we are faced with a Common sense, psychophysics, and experimental psychology provide ample evidence that all cognitive funcperplexing situation. Most of the authors appear to see these problems. tions are interdependent. Perception depends on memory and attention, memory depends on perception, This is the reason why, by and large, they limit their conclusions to their individual methodology and subject language depends on all three, intelligence is served by all of the above plus reasoning, and so on. Also of inquiry. Those who draw their conclusions with a modular model in mind generally couch them in probabiinterdependent must be, of course, their neural foundations. listic terms and with qualifiers. In so doing, however, they oftentimes reveal their hesitancy or outright impaElectrophysiology and human imaging increasingly support a common substrate for all cognitive functions, tience with the model. They appear conceptually caught between two opposite reductionistic currents, neither however spread out or "distributed" on the surface of the cortex. Cortical lesions rarely if ever affect only one of which leads to the common goal of this scholarly enterprise: the downward reductionism toward cellular cognitive function. An agnosia, for example, is as much a deficit of perception as it is of memory and of language. and molecular mechanisms that are basic to cognition but define none of it, and the upward reductionism toYet in this book several authors, on whatever grounds, follow the long tradition of ascribing different cognitive ward synthetic modules that seem to elude almost everybody and, when found, convince nobody. Rakic, in operations or contents to different cortical areas. Thus, they allocate an anatomical "module" to one or another his introduction, cogently reflects on the dilemma. The hesitancy and impatience of some of the authors cognitive function or specific item of cognition (e.g., a memory system, a perceptual category, retrieval, spatial with the cognitive module reveal the current intellectual malaise of a vast sector of the neuroscience community information, working memory, syntax, faces, names). Such inferences are informed not only by the effects of in its search for a solution to the mind/brain problem. The modular principle of neurocognition is under stress cortical lesions but by the physiology of primary cortices, especially if sensory stimuli have been used to test and the book shows it. This book is, indeed, a monumental "recueil" of inductive and deductive neuroscience the cognitive function in question. Often, however, the evidence behind the inferences is weak at the root befor anyone to use and admire. Much of it also is, in my opinion, a monument to a vanishing vision of the cerebral cause of certain methodological errors that tarnish several of the studies or their precursors.
cortex. At the risk of sounding grandiose, I dare say we are One of those errors, which we all commit at one time or another, is to constrain a cognitive function within witnessing a classic crisis of scientific paradigm (Kuhn, 1996) . Here, the paradigm in crisis resulted in no small the scope of the method used to test it, or the cortical lesion that impairs it. Sometimes, when I see it, the error measure from an overextension of the modular reality of sensory physiology ("the gate to perception") and is reminds me of the drunkard who, having lost the key sustained by attempts to "modularize" the neural subthem.) Cognitive information emerges irreducibly from strate of the mind. We are also witnessing the harbingers relationships that are probably far from linear; nowhere of a new paradigm, which makes a welcome appearance but in the cortex is it more true that the whole is more in several chapters of this book. I shall mention only a than the sum of its parts. Practically any cortical neuron few. The network paradigm appears in the chapter by or neuronal assembly, or module, can be part of many Singer, where perceptual information is based on a disnetworks, and thus many percepts, items of memory, tributed cortical network, as in a large cell assembly à or knowledge. A network can serve several cognitive la Hebb, though the electrical code of that information functions, which consist of neuronal interactions within is far from established. LaBerge presents a large-scale and between cortical networks. Because networks are cortical network, which would not only contain cognitive made of associations, any of them may be activated and information but support one particular cognitive function set into function by the activation of any of its associated to integrate it, attention. 
